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MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
In Prose 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re Marriage of: 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, M.D 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
Respondent, Appellant 
CASE NUMBER 20030800-CA 
OPENING BRIEF 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No 784449259 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
I 
Introduction 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) declare: 
I am the Respondent in the above referenced matter and am personally 
familiar with all of the facts stated herein below. If called to testify as to these 
facts, I could and would do so competently of my own firsthand knowledge. 
I would like to preempt my declaration with a statement about the Plaintiff. 
He and I were married for 25 years and had 12 children together. The 4pp©W@© 
was a benevolent husband and a kind father, always responding to the needs of 
those whom he loved. I fought vigorously to keep the marriage together and 
literally begged him to stay with the family. The Plaintiff's decision to divorce me 
was in a like manner "divorcing his own children., while knowingly denying them 
the daily contact and supervision of a father. This ordeal not only came as a 
shock but served to be very traumatic for all of us. Our journey has been long, 
difficult and painful. My children don't know who to believe, me or their father 
since our "stories" often contradict each other. I was in so much pain that I didn't 
realize that my children were also equally afflicted. As a result our children have 
1 
1 bonded together as shown by their behavior. They are true "survivors." Moreover, 
2 most of my children have provided a welcome fortress of emotional support for 
3 me. The Plaintiff's affair with a married woman who became his second wife 
4 caused irreparable damage not only to the family but to the Plaintiff himself. The 
5 man I was once married to-who at one time exemplified integrity, courage and 
6 kindness is not the same person today. It seems as though his five marriages 
7 have driven him in a downward spiral which has changed his character 
8 substantially to the extent that he's almost a "stranger" 
9 I do not take satisfaction in "taking" the Plaintiffs money which has 
10 become an obsession with him, but I see no other option. My health has 
11 deteriorated to the point that I no longer have the mobility I once had and I have 
12 become disabled; this was in large part due to my internalizing the divorce 
13 causing severe depression, esophageal spasm's and now I have Spinosus of the 
14 spine and related problems. I feel it is his responsibility to provide for me as he 
15 promised he would when we were going through the divorce "stating that he 
16 would never drop my income below $2000 per month even after the children were 
17 raised." This promise along with his insistence that I move out of the state of 
18 California with our children, so I wouldn't be involved in his "new life" was a 
19 promise that I have come to depend on. 
20 2. The real issue before the Appellate Court is the primary issue of which 
21 venue controls in the issue of jurisdiction pertaining to the matter of support for 
22 the Respondent by the Plaintiff. The Respondent's focus will be to provide 
23 evidence, fact and law that should convince the court that Utah jurisdiction is and 
24 has been the proper venue for the last 27 years since the dissolution of the 
25 marriage in 1977. The Respondent moved to Utah from California with eight of 
26 her 12 children within two weeks after the divorce was final. Two of the older 
27 children were on missions for the LDS church and two were away at college. 
28 The Respondent will proceed to show that the Plaintiff voluntarily and 
2 
deliberately acquiesced to the Utah jurisdiction filing and responding to motions 
supplemented with affidavits, memorandum, petitions to modify, etc for the last 
26 years .See schedule of Utah Orders 
3 (see ILA. 511-512 Vol, 1) ( R.A. 12#~128, Vol, 11) 
1. jUne, 1979 
2. April 28,1980 
3. Stipulation-June 30,1980 
4. July 7,1980 
5. 1980 
6. Ruling August 4,1981 
7. Nov., 27,1981 
8. July 14,1983 
9 1983 
10. April 24,1984 
11. Stipulation November 30,1984 
1984 
12. April 24,1991 
13. Aug., 26,1991 
14. March 10 1993 
15. July 28,1994 
16. April 13,1995 
17. April 28,1999 
Also it might be well to indicate additional activity as representative of actions 
in the Utah Court, with both the Plaintiff and Respondent appearing and represented by 
Counsel { R.A. 5*5-538, Vol, 1) 
1) Affidavit, Respondent 
2) Petition to Modify, Respondent 
3) Order to Show Cause 
4) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff 
5) Order on Order to show cause 
6) Affidavit, Respondent 
7) Order to show Cause 
8) Order & Judgement 
9) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff 
10) Affidavit, Respondent 
December, 18 
January, 4th 
January 23, 
February 5th 
April 24* 
July, 19th 
August 20th 
August 25, 
April 7th 
January 8, 
11) Notice of Conference Settlement January 26, 
12) Judgement March 3, 
13) Pre-Trial Order March 10, 
14) Order, Sanction of Plaintiff July 28, 
15) Memorandum of Law September 2 
16) Final Pre-trial December 1, 
17) Plaintiff withdrawal of Counsel January 3 r i 
18) Hearing January 27, 
19) Order April 3rd 
20 Affdiavit, Respondent 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1998 
3 
4. The Discretion of the Trial Court in this type of matter is very broad, the 
Court sitting as a Court in Equity, to make re-distribution or other modifications of 
the original Decree as equity might dictate. In Despain v. Despain. 610 P2d 
1303, et. 1305, the Court stated as follows: 
Under Utah Law, a Divorce Court sits as a Court in 
Equity so far as child custody, support payments and the 
like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing jurisdiction over the parties, and power to make 
equitable re-distribution or other modifications of the 
original Decree as equity might dictate. In both the 
formulation of the original Decree and any modifications 
thereof, the Trial Court is vested with broad 
discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an 
Appellate Court only in the presence of clear abuse 
thereof. 
5.. In early 1995 I wrote the California Attorney General asking for the 
assistance of the Attorney General's Office in collecting against Utah Orders. It 
wasn't more than a week later when the California AG office sent a memo to the 
Orange County District Attorney's Office, Department of child support requesting 
collection of the Utah Orders. 
-1 -
California Attorney General's conclusion ( R.A 182-185, Vol, 11) p.2, last line 
"Therefore, it appears to be established that Utah has continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction". (Emphasis) 
6. It was after a meeting with the Orange County child support officers that 
the Plaintiff made the decision to file a motion with the Orange County Superior 
Court requesting a hearing regarding the registration of the Utah Orders, citing 
jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Laches as his argument. (R.A. 1-25, Vol, 11) He 
failed. 
7. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the Defendant after 
hearing both arguments and reading the pleadings of both parties. After 
considerable deliberation the trial court ruled that both Utah and California have 
4 
concurrent jurisdiction, allowing the Utah support Orders to be registered, lifting 
all stays against them. (R.A. B24-B26, Vol, 11) It was at this point that the 
Plaintiff decided to file an appeal in the Appellate Court, Fourth District, Division 
Three, the State of California. 
8. In the current litigation before the Appellate Court, Fourth District, 
Division Three, State of California the Plaintiff is attempting to go back to a past 
ruling of the 1997 appellate Court, where the Appellant,(Respondent) Marlene 
Telford (Lundahl) attempted to have a 1994 Order set aside from a previous 
California ruling on the basis she was denied the opportunity to appear before the 
California Court. The issue of jurisdiction was not before the Appellate Court. 
See Opinion dated August 26,1997 {RA, 658-S61, Vol, 1). Whereas the 
Plaintiff asserts that the California Appellate Court in its Opinion of 1997 states 
that "California has exclusive Jurisdiction over Spousal Support" which is not 
accurate. The Honorable Commissioner Julee Robinson, of the the Superior 
Court of Orange County, California who heard the current case reprimanded 
Counsel for Plaintiff's suggesting she read the California Opinion again. ( See 
Transcript of Court Proceedings ( RA, 32-§3>; 30,36, Vol, 11 
The Court: I just have one question, I believe it's directed to yc 
Garland in some of the argument that you put forward you cited in 
the original—and this may be wrong but I thought were you citinc 
ou Ms. 
* ' " ' "
j , — ,, —
 0 _ _ . , — , lg
the original decision that had been made by our court, Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, which was Exhibit "G" which was filed on August 
26th 1997 for the authority that the court found that there was 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
I read that Opinion thoroughly and I didn't find any such dicta 
regarding one court or the other having exclusive jurisdiction. 
If anything, in footnote one on page four there was some discussion 
that Jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court of Appeals. On 
that appeal jurisdiction was not the issue. He stated, Quote, "so we 
have jurisdiction all over the Place" 
I'm not sure that Jurisdiction is the issue as much as it is the fact that 
she was essentially deprived of her right to be present at that hearing 
because of some comments that were made to her about what she 
did and didn't have to do. 
5 
1 So, the only reference I find in that Court, our own court of Appeals 
Decision, was basically saying it would be by virtue of dicta. It's not 
2 essential to the holding that there was some representation at the 
Hearing. 
3 
Anyway, that jurisdiction was not an issue, that there was jurisdiction 
4 all over the place and that Mrs. Lundahl's Counsel, at least, seems 
to feel there was concurrent jurisdiction at that time. Do you note 
5 that as well? 
6 Also in the court transcript ( R A 3 7 , V o l , 11) the Plaintiff's Counsel declares the 
7 following: 
8 The enforcement is occurring now and I believe that under the 
circumstances that it's appropriate to follow UIFSA and conclude that 
9 the 1994 California Order is (he controlling order because it could not 
be superceded by the 1995 Order 
10 
. . . Unless she [Defendant] advised the court that as to the issue of 
11 retroactivity that the Utah Court had made UIFSA retroactive to the 
cases that nave been filed before it was enacted and I think it would 
12 be very interesting that if this were occurring in Utah, where Mrs 
Lundanl lives she could not enforce this registration of these orders 
13 in that state because UIFSA, would be the controlling venue and the 
California order would not be the controlling order. 
14 
15 Regarding the above dicta the previous Utah Orders were valid under URESA. 
16 UIFSA was not ratified by the Utah legislature until April 6, 1996 and not until 
n January 1, 1998 by the state of California. Utah support orders were honored by 
18 the Riverside County ORS under URESA. Therefore, the additional support 
19 Arrearage, of $3500, $29,200, $61,100, $62, 991 all fall under the federal 
20 statutes of URESA. 
2 1 9 ) O^ffprrtla Dissolution order fired irt Utal> by Plaintiff as part of 
22 Utah Decree 
23 However, the California Dissolution Orderwas submitted and filed in 
24 Utah by the Plaintiff when he and his Utah Counsel Mr. Wooton appeared 
25 before the Utah Court in 1978 where the Plaintiff acquiesced to Utah 
26 Jurisdiction by submitting a complaint along with the registration in Utah of 
27 the California 1977 Dissolution Order requesting that the Utah Court act as 
28 the controlling venue. ( R A 54-60, Vol ,11) Along with a Complaint { R A 69-
6 
1 Volr 11} lines 18-26. Note the upper right corner of page one, where the 
2 dissolution document has been stamped by the Utah Court. This document is 
3 certified by the Utah Court. 
4 I The Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment and Decree of this Court 
incorporating the provisions of the Judgement and Decree of the 
5 I Superior Court of the State of California and to have said Judgment 
and Decree incorporated into and made a part of a Decree of this 
61 [UtahlCoutt 
7 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement and Decree of this 
court incorporating the provisions of the Decree of the Superior Court 
of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles in 
Case No SE D336650 (R A 70, (5, Vol,11) 8 
9 
10 
Also the Plaintiff states in 1983: 
On May 17, 1977, Petitioner filed a Complaint in the Fourth District Court of 
11 I Utah County, State of Utah, case number; 499259 for tne purpose of 
establishing the California judgment. { ft A 54-68, Vol, 11) item (6)-
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
"The Court finds that this Court has continuing 
24 I jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the Plaintiff." 
25 (560-563, Vol1) 
26 The Plaintiff has appeared personally, hired Utah Counsel to represent him 
27 and many times has been the moving party. See SCHEDULE OF VARIOUS 
28 I UTAH PLEADINGS-PLAINTIFF) ( R A 71- 72, Vol/! 1 ) 
7 
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10. The Defendant's argument is that Utah has taken jurisdiction of both the 
Defendant and the Appellee in divorce matters since 1978, See Utah Court 
Docket ( R A 72-86, Vol, 11) 
11) In the Respondents SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM (R.A. 
Attachment A, B,C,) the Respondent makes reference to the argument that the 
Utah Courts previously ruled that the Utah court has both personal and SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION (see R A 55$, and R A 560-563, Vol 1, 87, lines 21-
22 Vol 11), the court and the counsel of both parties had a discussion on the 
subject of Utah jurisdiction and on-going alimony. In pertinent par t . . . . 
Findings 
8. The Plaintiff's first Utah Counsel was Noelle Wooton, followed by Robert 
Moody, Donald Jensen, Richard Allred, Dana Burroughs, Sean Egan, Esq and 
David Drake. These parties represented the Plaintiff in his many Utah motions the 
Plaintiff has filed and responded to in the Utah jurisdiction. 
-4 
Jurisdiction vs jurisdiction 
9) The primary issue is whether the California Order of 2002 along with the 
long list of Utah orders (17) {R.A. 120-128, Vol, 11) are valid. See also the 
1995 and 1998 Utah orders summarizing arrearage that the Plaintiff owes the 
Defendant). (R.A. Attachment *E* ) 
-5-
PlaintifTs insistence on Utah jurisdiction. 
10. There is a long history of motions that have been filed by the Plaintiff 
in the Utah courts. The Plaintiff's purpose in submitting to and even requesting 
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts was based on the courts' reputation for being 
conservative in its judgements and rulings, See Vol 11, R.A. 188-196. Plaintiffs 
declaration of his wanting Utah jurisdiction), See Loose copy R A t f t S i i . 
The Plaintiff declares: 
I have voluntarily traveled all of the way to Utah for the purpose of 
submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah... 
"Respondent is till presently a resident of the State of Utah and I 
have indicated in previous declarations and or pleadings that I would 
be willing to submit myself to the Utah Courts" 
Equally important the Plaintiff asserts: 
11. In a motion filed by the Plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State of 
California, for the County of Los Angeles, December 18, 1986, the Plaintiff 
proceeds to establish facts demonstrating that California does not have 
jurisdiction to hear matters regarding issues of divorce by the parties, through 
8 
chronologically submitting numerous dates where the parties filed motions and 
appeared in the State of Utah. 9 H B H B H H 
I J H ' S COURT fCalifpmial MUST DISMISS 
RESPONDENT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO 
JgJQPlfVLA UTAH ORDER ON THE GROUND5THAT 
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
THE UTAH ORDER AS A FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 
In the case of Hamilton v. Superior Court. (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d418, the 
court declared that, "a foreign decree can be enforced in this state only by action." 
As such, the Court in Hamilton was merely applying well established statutory 
law. California Code of Civil Procedure Sec 1913 states: 
"The effect of a judicial record of a sister state... can 
only be enforced here by an action or a special 
proceeding." 
In the case of Leverett v. Superior Court: (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 126. the 
Court 
declared, in pertinent part, 
"It is now the settled law and policy of California that 
foreign—created alimony and support obligations, as 
well as child custody awards, unless established as a 
i 
 
foreign judgment in this state not be both enforced and 
modified in the California forum" (emphasis) 
The Leverett Court also cited with approval the decision in Worthlv v. 
Worthlev. (1955) 44 Cal .2d 465. explains that foreign domestic judgment or 
Decree once that foreign Decree has been established as a Judgment in this 
Sate. 
Markev: California Family law. Sec 51.06 [1] relying on Hamilton and CCP 
Sec 1913. declares: 
"The support and custody provisions in a foreign judgment or decree may not be modified by the courts of 
this state until the foreign judgment is first established 
as a California judgment. This may be done by filing a 
civil action or special proceeding to establish the foreign judgment as a California judgment. (Emphasis) 
2. THIS COURT MUST DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
9 
ASSERTION THAT ONLY CALIFORNIA HAS 
EXCLUSIVE CONTINUING JURlSpiCTION,~pN THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE CALIFORNIA COUFJT LACKS 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION" 
In the case of Sharove v. Middleman. (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 199, 201-202. 
the Court made it clear that a foreign court has the jurisdiction to determine 
matters of child support if "the Court obtains personal jurisdiction over the paying 
spouse and that THE STATE is the state of the Child's domicile, residence or 
presence." 
As a matter of fact: 
12. The Plaintiff has appeared before the Utah Court on numerous 
occasions as both the moving and responding party. As a result of one such 
appearance, on July 14,1983, (In response to Respondent's motion to modify 
support) the Fourth Judicial District Court, of Utah County, Provo, Utah made a 
support order which has continued in full force and effect until the present time. 
Since the Plaintiff has subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah, 
and since the Respondent and all of the minor children lived in the state of Utah, 
it was declared that the State of Utah had continuing jurisdiction to decide all 
issues regarding support of former spouse and children of the marriage. 
In addition, in the recent case of Daves V. Daves. (1985) 173 CA 3d 97. the 
parties obtained their divorce decree in the State of Oklahoma. Shortly 
thereafter, mother moved to the State of California and both parties entered into a 
written stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California. Husband later 
filed an action in Oklahoma which was subsequently dismissed on the grounds 
that husband had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of California when he 
executed the Stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California. 
" . . . Benjamin entered into a stipulation in which he asked that the 
Oklahoma judgment of divorce be entered as a California judgment and 
that the judgment be modified as to its visitation provisions" id. 106. 
The Plaintiff in the current matter falls under this directive when he 
10 
1 registered the California Dissolution Order in the state of Utah, as a Utah Order 
2 requesting Utah be the venue of jurisdiction. 
3 13. Historically, both the Plaintiff and the Respondent entered into a 
4 number of stipulations in the Utah court. The Plaintiff also appeared in Utah to 
5 have his deposition taken. The Utah Courts have repeatedly asserted personal 
6 jurisdiction over support and over the Appellee himself, who is domiciled in 
7 California but who has willingly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the State of 
8 Utah. Since the three of the Support orders pertains to "family" support a reading 
9 of Civil Code Section 5152 is necessary: 
10 (1) A Court of this state which is competent to decide child custody 
matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by 
11 initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of 
the following paragraphs are met: 
12 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time 
13 of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been 
the child's home state within six months before 
14 commencement of the proceedings and the child is 
absent from this state because of his removal or 
15 retention by a person claiming his custody or for other 
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent 
16 continues to live in this state. 
17 (b) It is the best interest of the child that a court of this 
state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
18 parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is 
19 available in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, protection, training, 
20 and personal relationships. 
21 (c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the 
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
22 emergency to protect the child because he has been 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or 
23 is otherwise neglected or dependent. 
24 (d) (i) it appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in 
25 accordance with (a) (b) (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
26 I state is the more appropriate forum to determine the 
custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of 
27 the child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
28 I Since the children of the marriage have resided continuously in the State of 
n 
1 Utah since 1978 up to their year of majority when they left their home to attend 
2 school or work, being emancipated at the age of 18, and where there was 
3 substantial evidence concerning their welfare, protection, training, and personal 
4 relationships, and the fact that the Plaintiff supplied their financial needs while the 
5 children were living in Utah, by analogy, the California Court did not have the 
6 requisite jurisdiction of the matters which have been identified. And since the 
7 Respondent has lived in Utah for the past 27 years and at the same address, and 
8 since the Utah courts took jurisdiction over alimony, it stands to reason that 
9 jurisdiction of support should continue in the same manner today, as it has been 
10 in the past. 
11 In the case of Jaqqer v. Superior Court. (1979) 96 CA 3d 579 the Court 
12 declared, in pertinent part, 
13 Even if jurisdiction exists in California, it may be 
inappropriate to exercise it here when another state also 
14 has jurisdiction and is ready to exercise it, and when the 
Plaintiff is willing to litigate elsewhere; a stay is the more 
15 common remedy." 
16 Another case of equal importance is Hafer v. Superior Court. (1981) 126 
17 Cal.App.3d 856. The Original Dissolution was made in San Diego Superior Court. 
18 The Court awarded custody of the minor children to the father. Thereafter, the 
19 father moved with the minor children to the state of Idaho, where they lived 
20 except for a brief period when the mother fled with the children and took them to 
21 Florida. Mother then filed a modification action in the San Diego Superior Court. 
22 At the time, the children were living with their mother in San Diego. The San 
23 Diego Court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that since the Court had 
24 rendered the original custody Decree, it retained continuing jurisdiction to modify 
25 provided that there was no pending proceeding in the State of Idaho. Father, on 
26 the other hand, argued that the California Court lacked modification of jurisdiction 
27 under UCCJA precisely because California was no longer the children's home 
28 state and they had no substantial contacts with California. He also argued 
12 
1 the fact that the San Diego Court who had made the original Decree was not a 
2 basis for jurisdiction in the modification action. In granting a writ of prohibition to 
3 prevent further proceedings in California, the Court of Appeals agreed that there 
4 was no basis for jurisdiction in California since Idaho was now the Children's 
5 home state. The court also stated that under UCCJA, the intent of the legislation 
6 was to prevent bringing modification procedures and unsuitable forums without 
7 making a bonafide attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the correct court. Hafer, Id. 
8 at 662. The Court went on to declare. 
9 The normal preferences for adjudicating custody 
disputes in the home state where the children live; 
10 where the most evidence of their daily living conditions 
will be found, where the continuity and stability of their 
parental relationships and their daily routines will be 
least disrupted by the legal procedure. This case shows 
a prime example of the kind of disruption the act was 
intended to prevent. Id at 865 
The present case is a classical example of what the Plaintiff is attempting 
to do to the Respondent. Just because the Original Divorce Decree was 
entered in the state of California, is not reason enough for the California Court to 
maintain jurisdiction, particularly in the light of: 
18 1) The Children along with the Respondent moved to Utah, 
immediately after the Divorce Decree was filed in California. All 
19 became residents of that State in 1977 
20 2) The Plaintiff took with him to Utah the Original California 
Dissolution Order and filed it in Utah, request i™ t h a * ' | t a h *• jurisdiction making the Dissolution order part ( 
The fact that both the parties, the Appellee and the Respondent, 
21 I ofthe Utah Decree 
continued to litigate in Utah, with both retaining Utah legal Couns 
evidence that Utah was the proper forum to hear issues relating to 
22 sel is 
23 child custody, support matters and legal discovery on both parties. 
24 In the case of Schlumpf v Superior Court. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 892 where 
25 similar circumstances occurred is another case of similarity. California was the 
26 original state of dissolution. The father and the children moved to Wyoming. 9 
27 years later the mother sought a modification of custody in the California Court. 
28 I The trial Court found that the California Courts retained jurisdiction. Later the 
13 
1 father filed a Writ of Mandate arguing that Wyoming was the most convenient 
2 forum. The Court of Appeals found California and Wyoming had concurrent 
3 jurisdiction. However, since the Children lived in Wyoming the court ruled that 
4 Wyoming had a closer connection with the Children and was the proper forum for 
5 litigating in the best interests of the children. 
6 Any one of the above scenarios could and should apply to the present 
7 case. 
8 14. And finally both legal Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent signed a 
9 Stipulation agreeing to Utah jurisdiction obeying the Utah Courts {RA, 132-136, 
10 Vol ,11) See p.4, lines 3, 4, and 5. See also same Document p.4 (c) Where the 
11 Support payments are frozen! 
12 . . . On each and every occasion described herein, Petitioner appeared in 
the State of Utah and submitted himself to the jurisdiction in the State of 
13 Utah for the purpose of allowing that State to modify support orders 
regarding both the Respondent and the minor children in her care and 
14 custody...( R A 194 Vol, 11) lines 1-5. 
15 -6-
16 Utah agencies declare the validity of Utah Jurisdiction. 
17 14. In 1992 The Attorney General of Utah wrote a letter to the Riverside, 
18 California ORS stipulating that Utah does have jurisdiction. (R.A.129,130, Vol, 
19 11} The Utah AG cited the circumstances and filings by the Appellee in the Utah 
20 courts. 
21 In 1996, the Utah ORS sent the ORS in California a stipulation verifying 
22 that the Custodial parent, the Respondent was in need of arrears owed her. (R.A. 
23 172, Vol , 11) 
24 -7-
25 Callforofa Courts stays Plaint i f fs California motions in favor of Utah 
26 jurisdiction 
27 
28 15. Superior Court of Orange County: (R.A. 117-{a) Vol, 11 
14 
With respect to the scenario where Respondent Mrs. Lundahl, is 
going to return to the State of Utahi the Court finds that if she does in 
fact return to the State of Utah with the minor children that there is no 
change in circumstances and prior custody orders issued and filed 
on August 24, 1987 [Utah] shall remain in full force and effect. 
Los Angeles County, Norwalk Court. ( &A. 139-140, VoJ 11) Hosp decl. 
All of Dr. Lundahl's actions for modification of the child custody case 
have been stayed. Dr Lundahl has 60 days in which to file a motion 
for modification in the Utah District Court; during that 60 day period 
you are awarded custody of the minor child Christian . . . . 
See also Respondent's Affidavit,{RA 145-148 Vol, 11) 
Note Respondent's Utah Activity summary of divorce matters 
in Utaft as wetl as CafffqiTtfa {HA, 78-80) coneqrreR^Y (R,A, 130,140; 141-
144, Vol, 11) (Utah minute Entries) (RA, 236,230, Vol, 1) 
At the time of the deposition Plaintiffs legal counsel was Sandra Rhodes. 
{Dep pM lines 7-11} Attachment): 
Miss Rhodes: In case youre interested, there's also an URESA action pending 
in Riverside all involving Mariene, as we say, a little forum shopping to see how 
we can do in which jurisdiction. I think. Im not involved in that, but I know it is 
pending. If the Court will peruse the entire deposition the Court will discover the 
Appellee's strategy of eternally filing motions in his relentless efforts to frustrate 
and exploit the courts as well as the Respondent. See also Civil Suit filed by 
Appellee on Respondent {R.A. 853-854 Schedule of Exhibits) 
16. The Plaintiff is clearly "guilty" of "shopping" other forums. In August 
of 1983 he filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angles, Norwalk Division. 
The Plaintiff was represented by Barry Wishart, in his petition for custody of the 
minor children. However as early as July 6.1983 the Plaintiff initiated custody 
modification proceedings in Utah. The matter was originally scheduled to be 
heard on July 14.1983. and the court made certain orders with respect to an 
increase in child support payments and a modification of visitation rights. 
However, the court did not rule on the custody modification, but continued that 
15 
1 aspect of the proceeding until August 15.1983. On July 16.1983. but two 
2 days after the hearing in the Utah matter, the Plaintiff filed an order to show 
3 cause for modification of child custody in the California jurisdiction. It was brought 
4 to the attention of the California Court and eventually the Court permanently 
5 I stayed the proceeding since the same action was pending in the state of Utah. 
6 
7 I a) Declaration of Hosp and the California Courts decision to stay the 
proceedings in California pending the outcome of the Utah Court's 
8 decisions.Petitioner ordered to return minor children to Respondent 
b) Letter from Wishart indicating Dr. Lundahl's willingness to return 
9 I Christian 
c Minute entry, Utah, Custody of children denied Dr. Lundahl; { RA139 -
140, VoH1) ( R A 192, Vol 1) 10 
n 
12 I (See also RESPONDENT MOTION TO QUASH, Utah minute entry, and 
13 I Affidavit, Respondent ( R A 513- 517, Vol, 11 (765-769 S e n a t e ) , 
15 I 17) Another time the California Court referred back to Utah jurisdiction was 
16 on November 16,1987, County of Los Angeles, Honorable Commissioner Frank 
17 F. Fasel presiding who ordered the following: {RA 116-119-Vol 1) 
18 I With respect to the scenario where Respondent, Mrs. Lundahl, is going to 
return to the State ofUtah, the Court finds that if she does in fact return to 
19 I the State of Utah with the minor children that there is no change in 
circumstances and prior {Utah} custody Orders issued and filed on August 
20 24, 1987 stiall remain in full force and effect. 
21 18. In 1987 the Plaintiff filed a declaration with the California court 
22 stipulating to Utah as the venue of jurisdiction and the Plaintiff's willingness to 
23 have the Respondent collect from his Corporation as well as from him personally, 
24 on support orders . (See RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASH- Plaintiffs 
25 Declaration R.A, 188-196-Vol, 11} See also California Stipulation of Plaintiffs 
26 liability both personally and corporately (Exhibit#1, Attachment) 
27 | . . . I have voluntarily traveled all of the way to Utah for the purpose of 
submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the state of Utah to modify all of the 
28 | many Court hearings. 
16 
i Note 1987 California Order, Utah lurisdictlort which is incorporated by 
2 reference as though fully set forth herein. 
3 19. While the support issues were being heard in Utah, (1993, 1994,1995) 
4 The Plaintiff filed another OSC dated January 15.1993 before the Riverside 
5 County Court in an attempt to modify the Utah family support order. The Plaintiff 
6 failed in his effort as the court ruled the Plaintiff would have to return to Utah to 
7 modify the family support order since Utah had jurisdiction over the matter. 
8 Again on February 22.1993, am month after &e hearing in Riverside, (see 
9 p,27 lines 1-3) of California Depostlon, Attachment "A") The Plaintiff filed 
10 another OSC in the Orange County Superior Court with a different Counsel 
11 Sandra Rhodes representing him. The issue was custody of the minor child 
12 Kwinci. At the time that this motion was filed the Plaintiff was in contempt of a 
13 Utah Court order mandating he place a $500 bond in the event he initiated 
14 removing a minor child beyond the state lines without notice to me. 
15 Essentially that is exactly what the Plaintiff did when he arranged for Kwinci to fly 
16 to California without me having any knowledge of where my daughter was. See 
n (Utah order $500 RA85Q-851 p.2, Item 3, Sclteduie where Utah had taken 
18 "continuing jurisdiction" regarding the custody of the minor children of the Plaintiff 
19 and myself with the California Courts upholding Utah jurisdiction having 
20 previously permanently staving any efforts on the part of the Plaintiff to have 
21 custody issues heard in the California courts. The California court (1983) referred 
22 back to Utah as the venue of jurisdiction on this issue. See (Hosp Declaration 
23 R A , 768-769 SCHEDULE p, 2, lines 1-7) 
24 20) On July 8.1994. the Plaintiff filed another motion in the Orange County 
25 Superior court with the purpose of terminating child support & asking for attorney 
26 fees. The matter was heard on August 8,1994. The Plaintiff filed still another 
27 motion on December 27.1994 in the Civil Court in the Superior Court of Orange 
28 I County charging me with breach of contract, common counts (money received 
17 
and owed back—$100,000) and fraud. Kent Tibbitts, my California Counsel who 
represented me "specially" when attempting to set aside the order of November 
16,1994 represented me in this matter also. Mr. Tibbetts filed a motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings; Points and Authorities with Request for Judicial 
Notice. Mr. Tibbetts also filed an answer & counter-claim. The motion was 
granted and the case dismissed. See (Civil Suit answer and counter-claim 
R. A, 853-S54 SCHEDULE) 
This is a total of seven different petitions initiated by the Plaintiff in a period 
of two years if the Utah petition is included. It is important the court remember 
that any motions filed in California was in direct conflict of the authority of the 
Utah courts and the statutes of URESA's position on jurisdiction. It is my opinion 
that this is a clear indication of "harassment" by the Plaintiff in order to frustrate 
me -purposefully using the California courts to serve his own purpose's hoping 
to win by" attrition" alone. 
-11-
CaHfornla state-witfe directorof f^ryii|y support cjfes Utah furisofcitfcrf Irt 
modifying orders (R.A. 157-164) {1§9 par #2J Vol, 11 
. . . effective with the enactment of the new UIFSA in California as of 
January 1,1998, a spousal support order will be modifiable only in 
the State which it was entered. If the California Court of Appeals 
rules that the Orange County Superior Court does not have jurisdiction over you or the modification of your support order 
because Utah has acquired jurisdiction after January 1, 1998 Dr. 
Lundahl will be able to seek modification of your Utah spousal 
support order only in the Utah courts. (Emphasis) 
The Respondent hopefully and respectfully anticipates the Utah Appellate 
Court, after reading the above 11 reasons why Utah should remain the venue of 
jurisdiction, will rule accordingly. 
21. The Respondent requests the Court take judicial notice of the entire 
18 
i packet of Exhibits (39) of the Defendants Pleadings ( R A 7$&$W Schedule) 
2 along with her SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY, { R A 720-750, Vol, 11 ))and 
4 the attached exhibits thereto. See also RESPONDENTS ADDENDUM TO 
5 DECLARATION, POINTS OF AUTHORITY RA6S7^$9 Schedule) 
6 
7 PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF 
8 BOTH UTAH AND CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONS. 
9 
io 22.lt is indeed unfortunate that the Plaintiff feels such contempt for justice 
11 and the rule of Law that he "attempts" to manipulate the court system bending 
12 when he can the infrastructure of the very system that protects our society and 
13 guarantees it's citizens individual freedoms, without any regard to the 
14 consequences of those he hurts. 
15 23. Depending on the circumstances, the Plaintiff's efforts are sometimes 
16 unpredictable, particularly when it adversely affects him. The Plaintiff in 1993, 
17 after acquiring joint custody of our youngest daughter, Kwinci, who never lived 
18 one minute with him and his third wife, after he paid for her plane ticket to 
19 California, leaving the Respondent distraught and anxious not knowing where her 
20 daughter was, Kwinci spent the next three years living with her brother, Brigham 
21 and his family, attending Temecula High School in California, with my explicit 
22 permission. I went to California to register her. Notice the dichotomy the plaintiff 
23 explores in his California deposition taken in California by his second wife, Ruth 
24 Carlson Lundahl. ( R A Attachment <*JT Appellee's Deposition pM, lines 1-
25 $|, It's in this moment of transparency that he claim's that Custody jurisdiction is 
26 in California and support issues are in the Utah jurisdiction. Since there are no 
27 longer children at home, this leaves the investigator with the impression by 
28 I the Plaintiff own acfeft&s/Ort that support issues are to be litigated in Utah. 
19 
1 Utah. See also California Minute Order which supports this thesis. "Court finds 
2 California had jurisdiction overissue of custody." Included in attachment See 
3 also letter from the Honorable Judge lllyron Brown of the California 
4 Superior Court defining the same resolution. (Included In attachment) In 
5 the same deposition, the Plaintiff's arrogance surfaces once again. (Dep. p 34 
6 Attachment). 
7 Q: Are you under an order to pay Spousal Support to Marlene? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q. How much are you ordered to pay her on a monthly basis? 
10 A: I'm not sure. I have a Utah order, I have a California Order and I'm not 
n following either. (Dep p.23 lines 4-5). 
12 (Deposition Extracts, Petitioner, Attachment "A"). See p. 24, lines 24-
13 25 
14 Q . . . 'Do you have an action pending to modify the California order? See all of 
15 p,25, lines 1-5, 
16 A. "No, I have an action in Utah. Riverside essentially looked at the thing all in all 
17 and said go back to Utah; that's where this thing belongs. So right now we 
18 have split jurisdiction; custody jurisdiction is in California and Alimony 
19 jurisdiction is in Utah." 
20 24.lt was only a few months ago that my Utah Counsel, Michael Esplin, 
21 called me to come into his office. He angrily slapped his desk with some 
22 documents. He had been served with a Summons by the Plaintiff. The 
23 PLAINTIFF had filed in the United State District Court, Central District of 
24 California. Santa Ana Division. (Attachment "C") motions citing does 1-though 
25 20 accusing certain parties of fraud, conspiracy, racketeering & corruption. Along 
26 with the Respondent, the Plaintiff lists three Utah attorneys, Esplin, Petty, and 
27 Fugal and their respective law offices which have successfully represented the 
28 Respondent. Also included in the Plaintiff's "black" list are four judges of the 
20 
1 Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah, who have ruled favorably in regards to 
2 the divorce issues regarding the Respondent. Included in the list is the Honorable 
3 Judges, Howard Maetani, Guv Buminqham, Donald Evre .and Lynn Davis.. The 
4 plaintiff in this action cites Utah Constables Anthony Ferlund.and Ron Lyons as 
5 defendants also. In addition the Federal Judge Honorable Glen Clark, of Salt 
6 Lake City, Utah, Julia Montgomery Deputy District Attorney .Orange County 
7 District Attorneys Office. Santa Ana California, Office of Child Support; 
8 Commissioner Julee Robinson of the Orange County Superior Court, and Mary 
9 Dahlberg deputy Attorney General of the state of California have been named as 
10 defendants. The Plaintiff is clearly out of control causing the Respondent undue 
n stress and emotional trauma. It seems that the Plaintiff, Gerald D. Lundahl sues 
12 anyone that opposes him in litigation or any judge that rules against him in a court 
13 room. The Respondent's Utah attorney, Micheal Esplin called the Plaintiffs Utah 
14 Counsel, Richard Drake, asking what the reason was for all the law-suits the 
15 Plaintiff was filing. Mr. Drake responded by telling Mr. Esplin that he couldn't get 
16 in touch with the Plaintiff because he was enjoying a long Holiday in Paris, 
17 France. To date the Respondent has yet to be served; however nearly everyone 
18 else in the state of Utah named in the Pleadings have been served. (See (a) 
19 Affidavit filed by Respondent's Counsel and (b) decision of the Federal Court in 
20 California; (c) letter from Utah Counsel Esplin to Plaintiff Utah Counsel Drake 
21 (See attachments C, (a), {&), <c), 
22 25.The Plaintiff has the propensity to go as far as he can in "bragging" 
23 about the things he -"gets away with-concerning the courts. A further review of 
24 the 1993 Deposition clarifies this statement: 
25 
26 THE PLAINTIFF WITH DELIBERATE CUNNING HAS MADE FALSE 
27 STATEMENTS, WITHHELD EVIDENCE, AND CONSTRUCTED FALSE 
28 I DOCUMENTS IN ORDER TO PUT HIMSELF IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT 
21 
1 I BEFORE THE COURT. 
2 
3 22. In 1993-94 when the Plaintiff appeared before the Fourth District Court 
4 in Utah he made false statements in his Utah deposition regarding his M.D.Diet 
5 Centers ( Dep, p, 31 -attachment) The various issues addressed were: 
6 a) Plaintiffs Purchase of diet Center in Moreno Valley California (1994) 
7 $47,500 (Schedule, R A 855-877) while claiming his only income is $1570 
8 per month. 
9 b Diet Centers registered in the State of Nevada under Imperial Products 
10 under. Appellee's 5th wife Mary Ann Hadley, Sec/treasurer. President: Robert 
11 Rohrbock, (who through affidavit claims he has met the Plaintiff only once, 
12 denying he was ever involved in a business venture with Plaintiff). { R A . - 7 6 1 , 
13 763,764,766, Vol, 111} 
14 c) Construction of a stipulation under the direction of the Plaintiff through 
15 his Utah Counsel Dana Burroughs claims Plaintiff s only income is $1,570 per 
16 month. ( R A 800-805 Schedule) 
n d) The Marketing of M.D. Diet { R A 885- 878 Schedule of Exhibits) 
18 Ownership of M.D. Diet Centers by Plaintiff is a published fact; 
19 e) Claim by Plaintiff that he had sold the diet centers to a "man" named 
20 L.G. Hinds, who turned out was Plaintiffs 3rd or 4th wife. { R A 879-881 Schedule) 
21 see Marriage Licence: "false" bulk sale to L.G. Hinds (Plaintiffs wife) 
22 f) Certificate of Delinquency on Imperial Products [cured]. Sec of State 
23 Nevada.( R A 878 Schedule) 
24 g) Plaintiff's affidavit submitted o Utah Court for lying. ( R A . 899-903 
25 Schedule) 
26 h) Respondent's Utah legal Counsel's affidavits and memorandum to strike 
27 Plaintiffs pleadings( R A , 883-898 Schedule), successful. 
28 i) Utah Court Sanctions Plaintiff for dishonesty and false claims (See 
22 
i Attachment Exhibits 3 ) 
2 j) Plaintiff's false financial declarations. ( RA. 910-923 Schedule) 
3 Compare to Bank Statements { R A 924-903 Schedule) 
4 k) Plaintiff's non-registering of any diet entities in any agencies in the 
5 state of California (R.A. 904-909 Schedule) 
6 I) Deception by Plaintiff revealing he made hundreds of thousand of dollars 
7 in 1993-1994 {RA, 924-983 Schedule) in direct contradiction of financial 
8 declarations filed with the court and Plaintiff's testimony of financial status to 
9 Utah court and the information submitted in the Plaintiff's Stipulation which the 
10 Respondent refused to sign { R A . 800-805 See Schedule) 
n 
12 PLAINTIFF'S DENIAL OF BEING IN UTAH ON CERTAIN DATES, 
13 AND DENIAL OF EVER BEING SERVED A SUMMONS 
14 
15 23.The Plaintiff's California Pleadings AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED 
16 RESPONSE is laced with falsehoods. (RA. 610-620 Vol 1 ) . 
n a) Plaintiff's allegation that he was not served, service went to a former 
18 attorney.{RA 35$ Schedule) Fact: Service received by Plaintiff (RA. 791, 
19 Schedule of Exhibits) Patterson letter, ( RA. 792 Schedule) 
20 b) Utah did not modify California order, because Utah was the venue 
21 of jurisdiction. At time Plaintiff had retained Utah Counsel, Bob Moody. Fact: 
22 Plaintiff files a Petition to Modify in Utah courts. { RA. 149-150 Schedule of 
23 Exhibits) 
24 c) The Plaintiff's denial that he was ever in Utah at the time the hearings 
25 occurred, nor was he ever served (RA, 791 Schedule Fact: At the time the 
26 Plaintiff was in Salt Lake City to attend a "self-help" group seminar (415 
27 Bearcat Drive) and was staying at the Marriott Hotel in Salt Lake City. ( RA, 
28 793-796 Schedule) ( 75 South West Temple where he was served.) 
23 
HEREAFTER, all evidence will be attached to the plaintiffs American Express 
card) 
d) The Plaintiff asserts he was not in Utah on January 16,1994. Fact: ( 
RA 796).& (RA 70S), 797-798 Schedule) clearly shows he was in Utah. See 
also R A 498 Schedule)denies ever being served Fact: {R A796) 
e) It is interesting to note that the Plaintiff who declares that he only makes 
$1550 per month has an American Express Card account (R,A 800-849) which 
indicates that he paid an average of $6000 per month against his American 
Express Card. 
f) The Plaintiff declares he never knew that he owed the Respondent 
$29.2000.(RA 802 Schedule of Exhibits) Bottom of page. Fact: In the 
Stipulation that the Plaintiff wanted the Respondent to sign in 1993-4) shows 
other wisej R A 802 Schedule) Obviously, the Plaintiff has developed a habit of 
telling half-truths and more often than not complete untruths. 
g) The root problem of all this lengthy and costly litigation go's back to 
October 31,1994 when a hearing was held in the Orange County Superior Court 
regarding an OSC that the Plaintiff had filed.on July 6,1994. When the Plaintiff's 
Counsel and the Respondent, In pro per was told by the Plaintiff's Counsel, Carol 
McHale in August of that year that the Defendant would not be required to go to 
any more California Hearings since the issue of jurisdiction had been settled by 
the two judges: Judge Guy Burningham and the California judge. See Affidavits of 
Michael Esplin, Defendant's Utah Counsel and the Honorable Judge Guy 
Buringham (RA 152-15$, Vol 11} 
h) Referring again to the court transcript ( R. A, Z7t Vol 11) the Plaintiff 
declares the following: 
The enforcement is occurring now and I believe that under the 
circumstances that it's appropriate to follow UIFSA and conclude that the 
1994 California Order is the controlling order because it could not be 
superceded by the 1995 Order. 
24 
1 URESSA not UIFSA controls the arrearqe of support monies owed by 
2 Plaintiff 
3 24. The California Court had ratified UIFSA (Uniform Interstate Family 
4 Support Act) on January 1, 1998, therefore the 1994 California Order was still 
5 under the auspices of URESA... .meaning that one order does not nullify another 
6 order from another state. 
7 Also the Plaintiff mentions the November 16, 1994 order in his argument, 
8 In his AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED RESPONSE, wherein the Plaintiff 
9 I asserts: 
10 
When the matter came on for hearing on October 31, 1994, the 
11 I Respondent was not present. The California Court modified spousal 
support and the amount of $500 per month commencing July 8, 
12 I 1994. This order was filed with the court on November 17, 1994 
13 
Nowhere in the Plaintiff's OSC of July 8,1994 is there mention of "modification" 
of "What" order. See Plaintiff July 6, 1994 OSC (R.A 650-682-Vol 11) (See also 
November 16, Order, 1994 Plaintiffs Pleadings. It is the understanding of the 
Respondent that the Plaintiff would have had to return to Utah to modify any 
support order since the Utah jurisdiction was the last venue to rule. The void 1994 
Order has since been superceded by the current order of the California Court in 
2002. 
26) It should be noted here that the Plaintiff successfully attempted to 
deceive and confuse the court by unilaterally stating in his Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points of Authority ( R A 227-234 Vol t ) 
. . . a Judgment determining property and support issues was entered in 
25 I California September 14, 1977. Thereafter, spousal support was modified 
by the California Court in 1987 at the [Respondent's] request... { R A 
26 I 229~Iin*s17-22V<*l1) 
27 I This entire statement is flawed and incorrect. The Plaintiff took advantage of the 
28 I court in his pleadings giving the impression to the California court that 1987 was 
25 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
1 the second time that the parties were in court since the 1977 dissolution order. 
2 The term "thereafter" is the key in which the Plaintiff asserts in his false claim. 
3 The Plaintiff failed to disclose to the California Court that in the interim of 
4 the years 1978 through 1994 98% of all issues regarding divorce and support 
5 issues were litigated in the state of Utah. (See, R A 705-719 Vol 111) MOTION 
6 TO QUASH -- DECLARATION OF RESPONDENT. The only Exceptions was 
7 when the final Divorce Decree was filed in 1977 In Los Angeles County and 
8 subsequently registered by the Plaintiff in the jurisdiction of the Utah court. See 
9 also { R,A, 139-140 Vol 11) where the California Courts referred back to Utah on 
10 Custody matters, followed later by the appearances of both parties in 1987 in the 
n California courts. 
12 During the 1994 hearing in California, the Defendant made a "special" 
13 appearance to notify the court that the "same "issues" before the California Court 
14 was being litigated in the state of Utah. The Court suggested to the Respondent 
15 that she and the Plaintiff's Counsel meet outside the court room and see if they 
16 could reconcile the matters before the court reconvened. The Plaintiff's Counsel 
17 told the Respondent she didn't have time. The Plaintiff's Counsel handed the 
18 Respondent a business card to give to my Utah Counsel and have the Utah judge 
19 call the California Judge to discuss the matter of jurisdiction. Mr. Esplin, 
20 Respondent's Counsel followed the instructions and called Judge Burningham. 
21 (See affidavit of Mr Esplin and the Honrable Judge Burningham { R, A, 1S2-1S6, 
22 Vol 11) 
23 Later Information surfaced which proved that the Plaintiff had not told the 
24 truth in his deposition and had given false testimony before the Utah Court. 
25 After the Plaintiff admitted lying to the Utah court through affidavit, (See R A 
26 Court Sanction Exhibit 1, in Attachments) the Court sanctioned the Appellee 
27 for lying and dishonesty and ordered him to place in a trust fund $3000 for the 
28 purpose of depositions on the parties involved with the M.D.. Diet business 
26 
1 located in the state of California, which the Appellee owns. (The Respondent's 
2 Utah Counsel, Mr. Michael Esplin, was expected to go to California for the 
3 purpose of taking depositions.) See also Plaintiff's affidavit to the Utah Court 
4 admitting to lying before the (Attachment, Exhibit T) 
5 28) The incorporated findings of the Utah court were that Utah had 
6 continuing jurisdiction of the parties; that the Plaintiff had failed to obey court 
7 orders, had given admittedly false testimony at his deposition and had failed to 
8 purge himself of the court's contempt order. (See SUPPLEMENTAL 
9 DECLARATION, RESPONDENT P.3 (RA, 72$-?S1 Vol 111). The Defendant 
io has added this evidence of jurisdiction by the Utah Court attached to this pleading 
11 also (Calendar of Utah activity) See Utah Docket. 
12 The Plaintiff defied the subsequent rulings of the Utah Court and fled to 
13 California to file another OSC on July 8, 1994 in the Orange County venue 
14 addressing the same issues. 
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16 DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
17 29. Currently, in the California Courts the Plaintiff claims the Doctrine of 
18 Laches in his support of his attempt to avoid honoring the Utah Orders.( RA. 
19 222*234, Vol 1)However, not only has the Respondent in this matter attempted 
20 through litigating on numerous occasions but through correspondence was denied 
21 assistance by the Utah Office of Recovery in her attempt to get satisfaction 
22 regarding the registration and collection oforders\ RA. 610~620 Vol 1}» Under 
23 normal circumstances the Office of Recovery in Utah must process court orders 
24 through the Office of Recovery in the jurisdiction of the Obligor. However, the 
25 Department of Health and Human Services in Utah would not avail the 
26 Respondent of their office claiming that it was against the policy of the Utah 
27 agency. At the same time the Utah Human Services Office which is the tribunal 
28 for the collecting of support orders suggested that the Respondent appeal to the 
27 
1 California Agencies. 
2 With this suggestion and with Extracts from the Handbook on Child Support 
3 Enforcement {RA, 179-181 Vol 1 1 ) distributed by the Department of Health and 
4 Human Resources, Washington, D.C. the respondent appealed to the Attorney 
5 General of the state of California. The Attorney General of California sent 
6 instructions to the Orange County District Attorney's office to begin collection on 
7 the Utah orders. Any authorized agency mandated to collect on family support 
8 matters is backed up by California Codes of Civil procedure. (See Exhibit # 2 ,7 
9 pages) attachment) 
10 Respondent's List of written communication to local, regional and federal 
n agencies 
12 1) Department of Recovery Services, 1996. 
2) Letter from Judge David Gray to Orrin Hatch, 1996 
13 3) Department of Social Services Sacramento, Calif. June 1996 
4) Administration for Children & Families, San Francisco, CA Sept 27, 
14 1996 
5) Department of Health & Human Services (also Riverside ORS) Feb., 10, 
15 1997 
6) Department of Social Services; Sacramento, CA May 7, 1997 
16 7) Director, Department of Human Services. 1997 
8) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. April, 27, 
17 1998 
9) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. Aug 8 1997 
18 10) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. April, 27, 
1998 
19 11) Administration for Children & Families, Washington, D.C. April 27, 
1988 
20 12) Regional Depart of Human Services, (Denver) Co, September 26, 
13) Director, Department of Human Services, Utah, 2001{R.A. 572-601 
21 VOl 1) 
22 These letters are but a reflection of the efforts made by the Respondent to 
23 register and collect on arrearage owed by the Appellee (See R.A.235-246, Vol 1) 
24 also ( R J t 688-699 Vol 111) See also ( R A 720- 751, Vol 111) As a result of this 
25 activity I felt any attempt by the Plaintiff to vacate the Utah Orders should be 
26 dismissed. All attempts by the Respondent during the years of 1996 through 2001 
27 was made in a timely manner. The Orange County District Attorney's Office 
28 became involved being the tribunal to collect on Utah orders. Fortunately they too 
28 
i filed motions. ( R A 783-784-CalIfornJa Deputy Attorney Oeneral, Wary 
2 Oahlbarg. \f0f£i 
3 The battle continues. The Plaintiff filed additional motions (See R.A. 824* 
4 $36, Vol 111. An Active motion is submitted by the Orange County District 
5 Attorney's Office {R,A. 800-804) acting as Intervenor. See also (R,A.803-812, Vo l 
6 111) and again. . . (R.A. 817-824, Vol 111) 
7 In letters to Carol Ann White, former director of support services of the 
8 State of California, under the direction of the Attorney General's office wrote the 
9 Respondent several times communicating the options available. (R,A, 157-184 
10 Vol 11 ) . Regarding the statute of limitations recognizing the collection of 
n arrearage, the Respondent defers to the Utah Supreme Court in their 
12 deliberations. 
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H Regarding the Plaintiffs current Pleadings: 
15 ( R.A. ) . . . the Predjudice to the Petitioner is the difference in the amounts of 
Spousal Support between the 1995 Order and the 1994 California Order is 
16 substantial. Had the Respondent not unreasonably delayed enforcement action, 
the Petitioner would have been in a position to mitigate nis damages by paying 
17 the Utah Support Order in a timely manner or modifying the Utah Order. 
18 The above statement by the Plaintiff all but admits his responsibility in paying 
19 the Utah Orders. 
20 Jurisdiction vs. Jurisdiction 
21 Utah Attorney General on Utah jurisdiction. (R.A. 129F-13Q)) 
22 Plaintiff Designation of Record on Appeal to Utah Supreme Court) 
23 Utah Stipulation (Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent.) (R.A, 132-138) 
24 Lundahl Dissolution: Letter from California Counsel Hosp for Respondent 
25 California action staved {RA, 139-140) 
26 Utah Minute Entries. August 15.1983: ( R A , 141444) 
27 Affidavit of Respondent: Chronology of California and Utah Actions: ( R A 145-
28 I 148; 177 (a); 
29 
1 Plaintiff's verification to Riverside Family Support by deposition that Utah has 
2 Jurisdiction. { RA.120128 E) 
3 Plaintiff's admission of "forum" shopping. \ Pep p. 23) 
4 Plaintiff's Constant filing of motions 
5 Plaintiff's false declaration of income. { R.A, $33-655} 
6 
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8 Additional Evidence of Dishonesty of Plaintiff in submitting false 
9 statements to California Court 
10 30. The evidence included in the current pleadings of the Plaintiff along 
11 with those accompanying other pleadings of this case provides evidence that the 
12 Plaintiff misrepresented facts and constructed false documents in his effort to win 
13 the favor of the court: (See RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION 
14 {720-2S1 Vol 111) j ^ u . %ei 
15 In the Plaintiffs Amended Reply to Amended Response { R A § 0 7 - 6 1 D VoJ 111) 
16 . . . In 1991 the Respondent filed a Petition in the State of Utah to seek a 
modification of the 1987 Order. However, I was not personally served 
17 with the petition, Instead a copy of the Petition was mailed to my former 
attorney, Roger Patterson, who represented me until approximately 1983 
18 at which time he was substituted out of the case. 
19 First of all the Utah Court was not modifying the California Order of 1987. See 
20 { RA. 70-71 Vol 11) Which refers to Utah activity from 1979 through 1999. 
21 Secondly, the California Court had referred jurisdiction back to Utah . . . ( R A 
22 117,139VaM1)lines10 16. 
23 
24 With respect to the scenario where Respondent, Mrs. Lundahl, is going to 
return to the State of Utah the court finds that if she does in fact return to 
25 the State of Utah with the minor children that there is no change in 
circumstances and prior custody orders issued and filed on August 24, 
26 1987 [Utah] shall remain in full force and effect. 
27 Thirdly, the Plaintiff's claim that he was not served is false. ( R A 791 Schedule). 
28 . . proof of service to Plaintiff. Additionally, the Plaintiff's reply and Petition to 
30 
1 Modify dated February 5th of 1991 is a matter of record. Plaintiff had retained 
2 representation by Robert Moody . And finally, the Plaintiff's reference to Mr. 
3 Patterson is faulty. The Defendant's legal Cousel had received a letter from Mr. 
4 Patterson, dated April 1, 1982 informing Mr. Esplin that he has withdrawn as 
5 Plaintiff's Counsel. { R A 792 Schedule), 
6 Moreover, the Plaintiff stipulates again that service to him in Salt Lake City was 
7 false, since he didn't live in Salt Lake City. However, the Plaintiff was attending a 
8 self-help Seminar at the address 415 Bearcat Drive in Salt Lake. The Plaintiff was 
9 served at that address, after the service official discovered he was at the Bearcat 
10 Drive from the check in desk at the Marriott hotel @ 75 w. South Temple, SLC. 
11 { R A 733-794 Schedule} In Plaintiff's AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED 
12 RESPONSE-
13 / was not even in Utah January 16, 1993.. . ( R A 794$chedule) 
14 Once again the Plaintiffs claims are refuted. See Plaintiff's American 
15 Express Card { R A 79§«Schedule) In further substantiation further investigation 
16 shows he was staying at the Utah Mariott Hotel, checking out on January 30th, 
17 1993 and had previously booked rooms at the Bonneville Inn Motel (2) times; and 
18 meals at Ho Ho Gourmet, and Village lnn.{ R A 795- Schedule). Further there is 
19 more evidence that the Plaintiff was in Utah in after again being served by a 
20 California Marshall. ( R A 796 Schedule). Yet, the Plaintiff alleges: 
21 
22 | . . . I had no knowledge ofthejjearing on February 23,1993, andjj/vas not 
23 
24 I Once again the Plaintiff's own American Express Card verifies the Plaintiff's 
25 attempt to manipulate the facts. The Plaintiff's credit card shows him in Utah on 
26 February 12, 21, 23, 24, 26, and the 27th. ( R A 797 Schedule). Contrary to the 
27 Plaintiffs claim that he was not in Utah nor was he served. 
28 I Another document which verifies that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the 
31 
1 $29,200 order was when he and his attorney Dana Burroughs constructed a 
2 stipulation which the Plaintiff wanted me to sign, on the premise that he only 
3 made $1570.00 per month. The Stipulation was faxed to my counsel Mr. 
4 Esplin. { R A 800-806 (802 Schedule} I had found evidence that the Plaintiff 
5 was not telling the truth and refused to sign it. Obviously the Plaintiff was earning 
6 more than $1570 per month. See American Express monthly payments, which is 
7 in dramatic excess of what he claimed he made, averaging in the neighborhood 
8 of $8000 per month charged on his American Express Credit Card.{ 118-
9 161 Schedule). Nevertheless, on page 3, item 12 the $2900.200 is mentioned 
10 which again proves the Plaintiff was aware of this order: {R,A. 802 Schedule) 
11 presentlyhas a judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$29,200 as entered by the Court on March 10 1993 . . . As satisfaction for 
12 that judgment, the Lundahl Trust shall pay to Defendant a lump sum of 
$ 5 , 0 0 0 . . . 
13 
14 
15 I IRA.( 87-279) 
SUMMARY OF FALSEHOODS BY PLAINTIFF 
16 
17 I 1) Proof of service to Plaintiff by California Marshall 
18 2) Proof of Service @ Marriott Hotel to Plaintiff 
19 3) Denial by Plaintiff of his various stays in Utah 
20 4) Notice of Utah Hearing service to Plaintiff 
21 5) Plaintiff's False Financial declarations to court 
22 6) Plaintiff's Contempt of Utah Court 
23 7) Plaintiff's affidavit of lying to Utah Court 
24 8) Defendants successful Utah motions against Plaintiff 
25 9) Plaintiff's Falsely constructed bulk sale of M.D. Diet to L.G. Hinds, who the 
26 Plaintiff said was a man, but in actuality was Lucille Gerakos Hinds the 
27 Plaintiff's third or (?) fourth 
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32 
PLAINTIFF'S OPENING BRIEF 
The Plaintiff's opening brief has deliberately withheld important information as 
well as incorrectly stating facts. The Defendant "Ruth" will follow the argument 
put forth by the Plaintiff "Gerald" in an effort to clearly state the "real" facts as well 
as presenting her argument. (See page two of Plaintiffs brief:) Ruth, however, 
brought actions in the same subjects in Utah which the Orange County Superior 
Court. 
Correction: It was Gerald who was the first party to file a motion in the state of 
Utah, not Ruth. In Gerald's first Motion before the Utah court he filed a complaint 
along with the 1977 California dissolution order. As the court will note there has 
been a long history of court activity, representing some 66 documents, including 
OSC's, Petitions to modify, stipulations, memorandums, declarations and 
affidavits by both parties. 
Gerald is declaring the Utah orders as void, when in fact the Utah Court has 
taken jurisdiction of both Gerald and Ruth. There have been in each case, where 
Gerald either appeared personally or hired counsel to represent him, and more 
often than not Gerald appeared along with his legal counsel in the Utah 
jurisdiction. Further more, according to "Family law codes and statues" 
jurisdiction is where the children reside. (See UIFSA statutes 
In EVERY action in the Utah courts, Gerald always filed a responding 
document. (See p, 3, Plaintiffs (Gerald) Opening brief. 
There were substantial actions brought in California thereafter in which 
both Ruth and Gerald participated. 
This statement is misleading: Both parties where present in California when the 
Dissolution judgment was handed down in 1977. In 1978 Gerald filed the 
Dissolution judgment in the Utah jurisdiction. Again in 1983, Gerald attempted to 
get custody of one of our sons filing a motion in Los Angeles County, Downy 
division. The court ruled that California did not have jurisdiction see (RA 765-
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1 769, Schedule )and as a consequence the Motion was transferred to Utah where 
2 the children of the marriage resided and where Gerald had simultaneous filed for 
3 custody in the Utah court. In 1987 Ruth was in California for nine months where 
4 one of her daughters trained in Tennis, and Gerald brought Ruth back to the 
5 California court regarding additional custody matters. The Court ruled that if Ruth 
6 went back to Utah, Utah jurisdiction would again apply to all divorce matters. 
7 Shortly thereafter Ruth returned to Utah. 
8 In August 1994 Ruth made a "special" appearance before Judge Myron Browns 
9 Court, in Orange County Superior Court. The court continued the case until 
10 August 31, 1994. Ruth did not appear for reasons explained above. In 1994-5 
n Gerald was represented by Utah Counsel Dana Burroughs. In fact, Gerald was 
12 still filing pleadings in the Utah court when Ruth made her special appearance in 
13 California. 
14 When Ruth filed an order to set aside, she lost on her motion. Subsequently, 
15 Ruth filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three. The 
16 Appeals Court upheld the order of 1974, denying Ruth any relief. Gerald in his 
n opening Brief states that the Appeal Court ruled that pursuant to the dissolution 
18 judgment, maintained jurisdiction over the parties and spousal support. However, 
19 the issue of jurisdiction was not before the Appellate Court at that time. Moreover, 
20 the court makes the statement:.. because the court, pursuant to the dissolution 
21 judgment, maintained jurisdiction of the parties and the spousal support. 
22 Unfortunately, the court never had any evidence showing that Utah had 
23 jurisdiction over the parties the last 27 years. Moreover, the basis for this 
24 ruling was the 1977 California dissolution order which the Plaintiff filed in 
25 the Utah courts in 1978, requesting that Utah take jurisdiction. This action 
26 by the Plaintiff voided any further California jurisdiction. Additionally Gerald 
27 filed a complaint with the 1977 dissolution order stating: ( R.A. 69 Schedule) 
28 The Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment and Decree of this [Utah] Court 
34 
incorporating the provisions of the Judgment and Decree of the Superior Court 
of the state of Cafifornia and to have said judgment and Decree incorporated 
into and made a part of a Decree of this [Utah] Court. 
Contrary to what Gerald assumes in his Opening Brief there was NEVER a 
motion dealing with just spousal support issues per se in the state of California 
other than the 1994 hearing in the Orange County Superior Court. Additionally, 
the" Appeals court was not aware of the history of court actions that involved 
Gerald filing various and sundry motions in both jurisdictions of Utah and 
California, where many of the motions required simultaneous hearings in both 
jurisdictions . All the activity of the Orange County Superior Court and the 
Appeals Court ruled with what little information that Gerald had provided to the 
courts in California, giving the impression, as stated previously, that the next 
hearing regarding divorce issues was in 1987, when in fact during the years 1978 
to 1997 litigation was occurring in the Utah jurisdiction. 
Again, in Gerald's Opening Brief, pJ5, additional deceit occurs. "After that 
appeal-
" . . There was an action brought by Riverside District Attorney (for Ruth) which 
culminated-" 
This statement is totally incorrect. The collections made by Riverside on behalf 
of Ruth was through URESA and occurred in 1991-2 and 3. The Appeal was 
heard in 1996. 
The Orange County District Attorney's Office registered the orders (April, 
1999 April 1995, March 1993, August 1991, and April 1991 as mandated by the 
California Attorney Generals's Office after considerable deliberation and following 
Federal Statues under the Enforcement of Child Support, along with the support 
of UIFSA, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. California ratified this Act in 
January 1998 and Utah in 1996. Until that Act was ratified the support orders 
were submitted and collected with the authority of URESA. 
Gerald in order to look "innocent" asserts he was attempting to defend "this 
35 
1 onslaught" of litigation with Ruth when in fact it was Gerald who initiated the 
2 majority of motions in California as well as in Utah. 
3 I assert that any continuing jurisdiction arising from the dissolution terminated 
4 when both parties willingly litigated the issue of family and spousal support as 
5 well as custody matters in the State of Utah. Both parties have litigated in the 
6 Utah jurisdiction since 1978, with the exception of a temporary stay in California 
7 where I located while my daughter trained for tennis. Even then, I claimed Utah 
8 as my residence and paid taxes there. 
9 
10 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY. 
11 
12 PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON 
13 CONVENIENS REQUIRED THE CALIFORNIA COURT TO STAY THE 
14 MOTION OF PETITIONER'S OSC IN 1994 EVEN "IF" THE COURT HAD 
15 JURISDICTION. 
16 
17 The California action in 1994 should have been stayed as a matter of 
18 comity in favor of the Utah trial (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction. Section 
19 354(2). p. 776) The doctrine of forum non conveniens is ancillary to the issue of 
20 jurisdiction. It requires that jurisdiction exists in two different forums or states (Cf 
21 In Re Marriage of Fox (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 862. 873 f225 CR 823]) This rule of 
22 law is codified in Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30 which provides, in 
23 pertinent part: "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in 
24 the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this 
25 state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any 
26 conditions that may be just." "There must be jurisdiction over the defendant and 
27 the assurance that the action will not be barred by a statue of limitations. 
28 (Stanqvik. supra. 54 Cal.3d at p. 752): (Shilev Inc. v Superior Court (1992) 4 
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1 Cal.App.4th 126. 133 I6CR2 38]) Although the Defendant raised a question of 
2 jurisdiction in California, she pointed to the pendency of the same action in Utah 
3 (Cf. Atlantic Richfield Company v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 168, 176 
4 [124 CR63)- motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens held to include motion 
5 to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arising from failure to include an indispensable 
6 party.) 
7 Consider: 
8 Once it is established that the defendant has engaged in activity of the 
requisite quality and nature in the forum state and the cause of action is 
9 sufficiently connected with this activity, the assumption of jurisdiction (i.e., 
limited jurisdiction) depends upon a balancing of the convenience to the 
10 defendant in having to defend herself in the forum as against the interest 
of the plaintiff in suing locally, and the interest of the state to provide a 
11 forum for its residents. (Cits omitted) In other words, once the threshold 
of sufficient activity of the defendant has been passed, the assumption of 
12 jurisdiction depends on the principles of "Forum Conveniens." (Rice 
Growers Association v. First National Bank (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 559 
13 [214 CR 4681). See also. Prince y. Urban, supra. 49 Cal.App.4th 1095. 
1073 [57 CR2 181]) Crosby, Justice-concurring, forum non conveniens 
14 part of resolution of jurisdiction issue. 
15 In a case in which the juvenile court's jurisdiction was not raised the Court 
16 of Appeal indicated that if an objection based on forum non conveniens was not 
n made in the trial court the issue was waived. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 
18 Cal.App.4th 551. 558-559 [51 CR2 43]) The appellate court distinguished a 
19 decision from the California Supreme Court in re Stephanie M.. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
20 295 [27 CR2 595]) The Supreme Court had considered a forum non conveniens 
21 argument in that case noting that" . . . the Court of Appeal erred in assuming that 
22 I without notice of a pending Mexican proceeding, the juvenile court was under no 
23 I obligation to consider whether it was the appropriate forum." ( In re Stephanie M.. 
24 I supra, 7 Cal.4th 295. 312 [27 CR2 595]) In The Defendant's case the court was 
25 l aware of the pending Utah litigation. 
26 
27 I A JUDGMENT OR ORDER MAY BE VOID BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED BY 
28 I FRAUD. 
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1 
2 A Judgment or order may be void because it was procured by fraud. 
3 Thus, it has been said that fraud practiced on the court is always ground for 
4 voiding or vacating a judgment, as where the court is deceived or misled as to 
5 material circumstances, or its process is abused, resulting in the rendition of a 
6 judgment that would not have been given if the whole conduct of the case had 
7 been fair. Steiner v. Flournov (1972) 23Cal. App. 3d 1051. 1055. 
8 
9 A MOTION UNDER FAMILY CODE SECTION 2121 LIES WHERE A 
10 JUDGMENT OR ORDER WAS ENTERED AGAINST A PARTY AS THE 
11 RESULT OF FRAUD. (1994 hearing) 
12 
13 "(a) In proceedings for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or 
for legal separation of the parties, the court may, on any terms thai may 
14 be just, relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any part or parts thereof, 
adjudicating support or division of property, after the six-month time limit 
15 or Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure has run, based on the 
grounds, and within the time limits, provided in this chapter." 
16 
17 Family Code Section 2121 
18 The grounds and time limits for a motion to set aside a judgment, or any 
parts thereof, are governed by this section and shall be one of the 
19 following:(a) Actual fraud where the defrauded party was kept in 
ignorance or in some other manner, other than his or her own lack of care 
20 or attention was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the 
proceeding. 
21 
22 Cal.App. 1964 General elements of cause of action for fraudulent 
representation are misrepresentation, including false representation, 
23 concealment, or non-disclosure, and knowledge of falsity, intent to induce. 
24 
Cal.App. 1982 "Fraud" and dishonesty" are closely synonymous, and 
25 "fraud may consist in misrepresentation or concealment of material facts 
or statement of fact made with consciousness of its falsity .Fo/t V Board of 
26 Medical Quality Assur. Of State ofCal.. 185 Cal.Rptr836 136 C.A.3d 12 
27 
C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987 Mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
28 defraud, i.e.,scienter, is satisfied if petitioner acts recklessly in his fraud. 
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S.E.C. v Burns. 816F.2d 118. 
C.A.Cal. 1970 Intent to defraud is an essential element of common-law 
fraud.U.Sv. Mead. 426F.2d 118 
Cal.App. 1975 Fraudulent representations require "scienter," an 
intentional, conscious misrepresenation. Hale v George A. Hormel & Co.. 
121 Cal.Rptr. 144. 48 C.A. 3d 73. 
3) Deceptive statements or acts. 
C.A.Cal. 1958 Under California Law, constructive fraud comprises all 
acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable 
duty, trust or confidence, resulting in damage to another. Grenier v. 
Hariev. 250 F. 2d 539. 
4) Nature in General-
Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1986 Among the elements of a common-law cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation are that defendant has made an 
untrue representation as to a past or existing material fact. Insurance 
Underwriters Clearing House. Inc v. Natomas Co.. 228 Cal.Rptr. 449. 184 
C.A.3d 1520 
Cal.App. 2 Dist 1987 Misrepresentation must be material and knowingly 
false representation of fact. Handel v. U.S. Fidelity and Gaur. Co.. 237 
Cal. Rptr. 667. 192 C.A.3d 6~8~47 
5) Falsity and knowledge thereof. 
Cal. 1961. Even negligence of petitioner in failing to discover falsity of 
statement is no defense when misrepresentation is intentional, rather than 
negligent. Smith V. Williams. 361 P2d. 241. 12 Cal. Rptr. 665. 55 C.2d 
Cal.App. 1964 While a person may not be under duty to speak, he does 
have moral as well as a legal duty to speak truth if he does so. Balfour. 
Buthrie & Co v. Hansen. 38 Cal. Rptr. 525. 227 C.A.2d 173. 
6) Fraudulent concealment. 
C.A.9. (Cal.) 1988 In order for a mere omission to constitute actionable 
fraud, defendant must demonstrate that plaintiff had a duty to disclose 
the fact(s) at issue. Cohen, v. Wedbush. Noble. Cooke. Inc.. 841 F.2d 282 
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1 The vital question in such a case (where equitable relief is sought based on 
2 | extrinsic fraud or mistake) is whether the successful party by inequitable conduct, 
either direct or insidious in nature, lulled the other party into a state of false 
4 I security, thus causing the latter to refrain from appearing in court or asserting 
5 legal rights. Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal. App. 3d 284. 291 
6 Equity's jurisdiction to interfere with final judgments is based upon the 
absence of a fair, adversary trial in the original action. It was a settled 
7 doctrine of the equitable jurisdiction—and is still the subsisting doctrine 
except where it has been modified or abrogated by statute... that where 
8 the legal judgment was obtained or entered through fraud, mistake, or 
accident, or where the defendant in the action, having a valid legal 
9 defense on the merits, was prevented in any manner from maintaining it 
by fraud, mistake, or accident, and there had been no negligence, laches, 
10 or other fault on his part, or on the part of his agents, then a court of 
equity will interfere at his suit, and restrain proceedings on the judgment 
n which cannot be conscientiously enforced. Typical o f the situations in 
which equity has interfered with final judgment are the cases where the 
12 lack of a fair adversary hearing in the original action is attributed to 
matters outside the issues adjudicated therein which prevented one party 
13 from presenting his case to the court, as for example, where there is 
extrinsic fraud. Caldwell v. Taylor. 218 Cal. 471 fz3 Pac. (2d) 758. 99 A. 
14 L.R. 1194; McGuiness v. Superior Court. 196 Cal. 222 f2371 Pac. 42. 40" 
A.L.R. 11/1^71921) 9 Cal L Rev. 156: (1934) 23 Cal1 L. Rev. 79: 15 Cal 
Jur 14 et seq) 3 Freeman. Judgments [5"' edj. p.2562. et seq) or intrinsic 
mistake. 
Additionally 
15 
16 
17 
There are four grounds which a court utilizing its equity capacity may rely 
18 upon to provide relief from a default. Those areas are: (1) Void judgment, (2) Extrinsic fraud, (3) Constructive service, and (4) Extrinsic mistaKe. (5 
19 Witkin. Cal.Procedure (2ed. 1971) Attack of Judgment in Trial Court. 
Section 182 p. 3751: Section 183. p. 3752: Section 169. p. 3740: Section 
20 187. p.3757. 
21 The Supreme Court has indicated that original negligence in allowing the 
default to be taken will be excused if the aggrieved party makes a strong 
22 showing of diligence in seeking relief soon after discovering entry of the judgement. (Hallett v. Slaughter (194) 22 Cal.2d 552, 140 P.2d 3.) 
23 | 
A judgment, whether by litigation or consent, may be attacked where 
24 extrinsic fraud was employed to secure it. Civic Western Corp. v Zila 
Industries. Inc. (App 2 Dist. (1977) 135 CalRptr. 915 66 Ca:.App.3d I. 
25 " 
26 I 7) Equitable Relief-Proceedings-Action or Motion.— 
27 One who has been prevented by extrinsic factors from presenting his or her 
case to the court may bring an independent action in equity to secure relief 
28 I from the judgment enteredagainst him or her, or where the court that 
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1 rendered the Judgment possesses general jurisdiction in law and equity, he 
may invoke equityjurisaiction by a motion addressed to such court. Olivera 
2 v. Grace 19 c. 2cf 570 (Contrary language i. United States District Attorney 
. 148 cal 773. 84 Pac. 152. 113 Am. St. Rep 354. declared inaccurate) 
3 
4 
5 ARGUMENT AGAINST CALIFORNIA JURISDICTION 
6 
7 Subject matter jurisdiction can be attacked at any time, in addition to in 
8 personam jurisdiction and this does not constitute a general appearance. 
9 (Boisclair v. Superior Court. (1990)) 51 Cal.3d 1140. 1144. fn.1 [276 CR 62j) 
10 A party may also make a hybrid motion to quash/dismiss, thereby challenging 
11 both subject matter and personal jurisdiction without making a general 
12 appearance. (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 387. p. 991. 
13 The judgment of a court may always be impeached for want of jurisdiction, and 
14 when the judgment is upon a subject matter over which the court could, under no 
15 circumstances, have any jurisdiction, the objection may be taken at any time 
16 when such a judgment is invoked. ( Rogers v. Cadv (1894) 104 C. 288. 291. 292 
n [38 P. 81]); See also Witkin. California Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, sections 
18 338. 339, pp. 926-929) 
19 During the period when the Defendant was in California asserting that the 
20 California Court had no jurisdiction because there was a case pending in Utah 
21 (1994-95-96) the Court incorrectly asserted that the California courts had in 
22 personam jurisdiction as a result of the dissolution judgement in 1978, when in 
23 fact that dissolution judgment was filed in the State of Utah, in 1978 by the 
24 Plaintiff acquiescing to Utah jurisdiction . 
25 The Defendant asserts that any continuing jurisdiction arising from the 
26 dissolution terminated when both parties willingly litigated the issue of family and 
27 spousal support as well as custody matters in the State of Utah. Both parties 
28 have litigated in the Utah jurisdiction since 1978. 
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See Solley v. Sollev (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 522. 529 [38 CR 8020 -both 
parties entered into a property settlement agreement in California, then 
invoked the jurisdiction of the State of Nevada for their divorce and 
incorporation of the property settlement agreement. When wife later filed suit 
in California for an accounting, the Court of Appeal determined that the 
Nevada decree was binding on the parties and California had no jurisdiction. 
See also (Cf. Leyerett v. Superior Court (1963) Caj.App.2d 126 f34 CR 7841 -
continuing jurisdiction where wife registered Washington judgment in California 
then opposed California jurisdiction. 
A California court can exercise personal jurisdiction "on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the United States. (California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 410.0) The only federal limitation on California 
courts assertion of long-arm jurisdiction is "Whether the party has "minimum 
contacts" with the state so that prosecuting the suit locally "does not offend 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Kulko v. California 
Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84. 92 f56 L Ed.2d 132m 141m 98.Ct. 1690) 
Application of this minimum contact standard requires that there be some act by 
which the nonresident "purposefully avails" herself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state. (Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra. 436 
U.S. at pp. 93-94 [56 L.Ed 2d at pp.142 143]). 
The fairness question necessitates balancing the burden of inconvenience 
to the Defendant against the states interest in resolving the dispute. (Id. At pp. 
97-101 f56 LEd.2d at pp 144-147]). It was not fair to force the Defendant to 
litigate the same matter in California that was pending in the State Court of Utah. 
(In Re Marriage of Aaron. Supra. 224 Cal. App.3d 1086. 1095 f274 CR 357]) 
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority, i.e., 
competency, to adjudicate the type of controversy involved. (Witkin. California 
Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, section 6(c). p. 552]). The actions of a court 
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and may be set aside at any time. 
(Estate of Buck, supra.. 29 Cal.App.4th 1846. 1854 [35CR2 442j). If as 
contended California lacked subject matter jurisdiction there was no 
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1 concurrent jurisdiction involved and Utah had exclusive jurisdiction. (Witkin. 
2 California Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, section 427(1 ).p. 1042) 
3 The California Supreme court has indicated that making a special appearance 
4 and a motion to quash, is a procedure limited to attacking a lack of personal 
5 jurisdiction and is inappropriate in attacking an absence of subject jurisdiction 
6 (Greenery. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028. 1035 
7 [25CR2 539|) A motion to quash service of summons lies on the ground that the 
8 court lacks personal, not subject matter jurisdiction over the moving party. (Code 
9 Civ. Proc. Section 418.10: Cal.4th at p. 1036) Personal or in personam 
10 jurisdiction depends upon three factors: (A) Jurisdiction of the state. (B) Due 
n process, i.e., notice and opportunity for hearing. (C) Compliance with statutory 
12 jurisdiction requirements of process (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction. 
13 section 80. pp. 45-451.) Jurisdiction is based on an underlying principle of 
14 "relationship to the state" which makes the exercise of jurisdiction "reasonable." 
15 (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 82. p. 452.) The Defendant 
16 and the children of the marriage have been residents of the state of Utah since 
17 1977. A special appearance requires no particular form and the argument and 
18 relief sought, i.e., objection to personal jurisdiction, control over a designation. 
19 (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, sections 149-151. 160. pp. 534-537. 
20 545-546) 
21 In some situations the assertion of other grounds besides the lack of 
22 personal jurisdiction can constitute a general appearance or a waiver of the 
23 personal jurisdiction issue. May the Defendant remind the Court of the 
24 Defendants assertion that the trial court should have deferred to the pending 
25 action in Utah. This is in the nature of a forum non conveniens argument. (RT. 
26 8:9-24) However, raising such an objection does not waive the lack of personal 
27 jurisdiction defense. (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 166. p. 
28 I 551) 
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1 Once the Defendant raised the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction the 
2 burden should have shifted to the Plaintiff to establish minimum contacts with the 
3 state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
4 fair play and substantial justice. (The Court of Appeal. Crea. V. Busby (1966) 48 
5 Cal.App.4th 509. 514 [55 CR2 513) 
6 The state of California ratified the UIFSA Act in January of 1998. The Utah 
7 Court ratified the same Act in April of 1996. 
8 1. 
9 "URESA" IS THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER OF THE 
10 1995 UTAH ORDER SINCE JURISDICTION OF ALL SUPPORT MATTERS 
11 REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF AND THE RESPONDENT WAS TAKEN BY 
12 THE UTAH COURTS. 
13 The Plaintiff historically submitted to the statutes of URESA honoring the 
14 Utah orders, which were registered by the District Attorneys Office of Riverside 
15 County in the state of California. According to [UIFSA] under the Chapter of 
16 Jurisdiction ( 78-45f-201) . . . "this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
17 a non-resident individual, if: 1} the individual is personally served with notice 
18 within this state ; l ! ) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state bv 
19 consent bv entering a general appearance, orbv filing a responsive document 
20 having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction:... 1) there is 
21 any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United 
22 States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction . | l |) The custodial parent and the 
23 children resided in the state of Utah. The Plaintiff has consistently fulfilled all 
24 of the above, issues were pending in the State of Utah. 
25 -2-
26 THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RE: ISSUES OF URESA 
27 The purpose of [URESA] is to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation in 
28 separate jurisdictions the enforcement of existing duties of family support. See 
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1 NRS 130.030: State ex rel. Welfare Div v. Vine. 99 Nev. 278. 283. 662 P.2d 
2 295. 298(1983). Generally speaking, [URESA] itself "creates no duties of family 
3 support, but is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already existing 
4 duties when the person to whom a duty is owed is in one state and the person 
5 owing the duty is in another." See Annotation. Construction and Effect of 
6 Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. NRS 130.280 (1) 
7 directs that: A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this 
8 chapter does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court 
9 of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of 
10 any other state pursuant to a substantially similar law or any other law, 
11 regardless of priority of issuance . . .(Emphasis). 31 ALR 4th 347. 351 (1984) 
12 citing Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Commissioner's 
13 Prefactory Note, 9B U.LA. 382 (1968); see also NRS 130.280; Vix V. State of 
14 Wisconson. 100 Nev. 495 686 P.2s 226 (1984) (in URESA proceedings, a court 
15 only has jurisdiction to order enforcement of pre-existing duties of support). 
16 Moreover, the remedies provided by the act are "in addition to and not in 
17 substitution for any other remedies." See NRS 130-050. The act further 
18 provides that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
19 purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." See NRS 
20 130.020. (Emphasis)P11 [**6] URESA's choice of law provision provided that 
21 the "duties of support . . . are those imposed . . . under the laws of any state 
22 where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought." 
23 Utah Code Ann. @ 77-31-7 (1995) (repealed 1997). Thus under URESA, Utah's 
24 statute of limitations would govern the duration for which support could be 
25 recovered... . However, UIFSA's choice of law provision states that "in a 
26 proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of this 
27 state or of the issuing state, whichever is the longer, applies" Utah Code 
28 I Ann. @ 78-45F-604 (Supp. 1998). 
45 
1 (P.12). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "statutes of limitations are 
2 essentially procedural in nature and . . . . do not abolish a substantive right to sue 
3 . . . "Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993): See also Financial Bancoorp. 
4 Inc. V. Pinqree & Dahle. f**7] Inc.. 880 P2d 14m 16 (Utah ct. App. 1994) (stating 
5 "Utah follows majority position that limitations periods are generally procedural in 
6 nature"). Similarly, UIFSA's choice of law provision does not establish a 
7 substantive right or create a duty of support, but simply changes the mechanism 
8 by which support orders are enforced by instructing the court as to which law to 
9 apply in calculating arrearages. UIFSA merely provides a framework for 
10 enforcing one states support order in another jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, the 
n outcome may differ depending on which statute of limitations is applied; however, 
12 the rights created and possessed by the parties are found in provisions separate 
13 and apart from the choice of law section. . "Full faith and credit" provisions 
14 are outlined in the United f*943] States Constitution. (Emphasis) 
15 B. Spousal Support Obligation 
16 Utah Code Ann. @ 78-45f-206 (2) (Supp. 1998). ( P26) makes it clear in it's 
17 reference to Spousal Support. In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support 
18 order issued by another state if the Utah court has "continuing, exclusive 
19 jurisdiction" over the spousal support order. The method of which a Utah court 
20 order obtains "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over a spousal support order is 
21 by [*9461 "Issuing [**19] a support order consistent with the law of this state . . 
22 ." Utah id. Cob. 78-45f-205 (6). Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain "continuing, 
23 exclusive jurisdiction unless it issues the spousal support order. . 6 ) . . A 
24 tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this 
25 state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order 
26 THROUGHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION! Since 
27 1980 the "family Support" orders issued by the state of Utah and collected upon 
28 by the Riverside ORS included both Child support and alimony. All other orders 
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1 which are now in dispute are family support orders, with the exception of the 1998 
2 Support Order. The 1995 Order stipulated the amount of spousal support but all 
3 arrearage was family support. (See Attchment) 
4 
5 FACTS REGARDING UTAH RULINGS ON JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES AS 
6 UPHELD IN THE UTAH COURTS 
7 
8 JHE UTAH COURT MAY PROPERLY EXERCISE JURISDICTION BECAUSE A 
9 FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED BY A SHOWING OF 
10 CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
11 The Plaintiff asserted the Utah court lacked jurisdiction because the 
12 decree which the Defendant sought to modify was originally rendered in a 
13 California Court. This is clearly not the law. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
14 Utah Courts have the jurisdiction to modify the provisions of a foreign divorce 
15 decree if such decree could be modified under the law of the rendering state and 
16 under Utah Law. McLane v. McLane 570 P.2d 692 (1977). 
17 The giving of full faith and credit to the judgement of a sister state simply 
18 requires that it be given the same credit as it would be given in that state; and 
19 also the same credit that it would be given if rendered in the courts of our own 
20 | state. With respect to divorce decrees the Utah statute provides that: 
The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to the su ' ' 
custody of children and their suppor 
reasonable and necessary. Even th< 
circumstances existing at the time of the decree if there are changed 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
or ne  orders ith respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of children and their support and maintenance. . . as shall be 
reasonable and necessary. Even though the decree is res judicata as the 
circu stances existing at the ti e of the decree if there are changed 
circumstances so requiring there can be further adjudication thereon. A Courts 
decision concerning ihe amount of support can, however, be modified at any 
time during the support payment period (Civil Code 4801 (a) in remarraige of 
Morrison T43 Cal Rptr. 139 573 P.2d 41. (1978). 
A divorce decree can also be modified under Utah law by showing a change in 
circumstances. Thus the full faith and credit requirement is met because the 
modification sought is appropriate under both California and Utah law. 
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1 In the McLane case involving a custody dispute, the court set forth the 
2 requirements for jurisdiction in a case of this nature. 
3 "The needs of children for sustenance and for protective care are 
continuous and it is essential that wherever they may be the court 
4 have jurisdiction to safe guard their interest and welfare. 
Consequently for that purpose properly interested parties may invoke 
5 the jurisdiction of the court based on either (1) the domicile of the 
child or (2) the presence of the child within the state or (3) in 
6 personum jurisdiction over the parties seeking custody. Furthermore, 
anyone, or more of those basis is sufficient foundation for jurisdiction 
7 I upon which a court may proceed to hear and determine such 
controversy. 
8 ' 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
28 
Under this statue and case law the California Court had no right to hear a custody 
matter in 1993 since (1) California Courts had previously ruled in this matter 
(1983) saying that only Utah had jurisdiction.^) the Utah courts had taken 
personum jurisdiction on the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant and the children of 
the marriage. (3) The Plaintiff had willingly submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Court. 
ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS WERE MET BECAUSE 
THE DEFENDANT [RESPONDENT] AND THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES 
WERE RESIDENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH BY BRINGING ADDITIONAL ACTIONS. 
Family Code 
Section 3453 Full faith and credit; Enforcement of another states custody 
24 I determination. A court of this state shall accord full faith and credit to an order 
issued by another state, and consistent with this part, enforce a child custody 
25 I determination by a court of another state unless the order has been vacated, 
stayed or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under Chapter 2 
26 (commencing with Section 3421) 
27 Section 4320. Circumstances to be considered in ordering Spousal 
Support. In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider 
all of the following circumstances, (a) The extent to which the earning capacity 
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of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during 
the marriage, taking into account all of the following: (2) The extent to which 
supported party's present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of 
unemployment that were incurred during trie marriage to permit the supported 
party to devote time to domestic duties 7 12 children) (b) The extent to which 
the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a 
career position, or a license by the supporting party. (See Exhibit 42-Mam 
Action- Respondanfs declaration to court) (c) The ability to pay of the 
supporting party, taking into account the supporting party's earning capacity, 
earned and unearned income, assetst and standard of living, (d) The needs of 
each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage, (f) 
The duration of the marriage [25 years] (h) the age and health of the parties, 
including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress—(due to 
withholding support payments) (j) The balance of the hardships to each party. 
Section 4909 Continuing jurisdiction. (2) until all of the parties who are 
individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for a 
tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (see Exhibits *2 & *3*l$airj action where Petitioner pleas before 
the court that he is subject to t\)0 jurisdiction of the Utah courts) (3)-(d) A 
tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this 
state has continuing jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the 
existence of the support obligation (See UiFSA- where this same statue 
applies to Utah junsdictioa since all spousal support orders have been 
initiated in the Utah jurisdiction for 25 years with one exception where the 
Respondent was temporarily in California in support of her daughters tennis 
career) Yet the Respondent claimed residency in the state of Utah. 
A summary outline of jurisdictional issues. 
Pleading Action YR 
Def: Motion to Quash Plaintiff Register of California Order 1977 
California Dissolution order Registered in Utah 1978 
Calif Order: back to Utah 1983 
Hosp letter; Utah custody 1983 
List of Utah Orders 1978—1998 
Utah Jurisdiction, Utah Attorney General 1992 
Judge Brown on Calif custody I993 
Plaintiff: Utah Petition to Modify 1993 
Federal Handbook statutes 
Calif AG Office on registering of Utah 2001 orders 2001 
Notice to Salt Lake Attorney (Plaintiff) 1998 
Declaration: Plaintiff submits to Utah 1987 
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Plaintiff's motion: California Does not have jurisdiction. 1983 
Respectfully, 
Date / ^ / / 2003 
Marlene TeTford'd-Undahl) (Lu
In pro Se 
10 I p.s. An ADDENDUM will follow with supporting motions and statements from the 
California Attorney Generals Office and an Amicus Curiae Brief from the Attorney 
n I Generals Office in Texas, filed in the California courts per California AG Office., 
Also copies of three (3) letter briefs to be filed in the Appellate Court of California 
12 in deference to a request from the bench. The California AG; Barry Brooks 
Amicus Brief and myself are the participants. 
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MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
In Pro se 
In re Marriage of: 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, M.D 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
Respondent, Appellant 
) CASE NUMBER 20030800-CA 
ADDENDUM TO 
OPENING BRIEF 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No 784449259 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The Plaintiff has filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeals District 4, 
Division 3. Officers of some California Agencies have filed with the California Courts 
documents upholding jurisdiction in Utah. I have chosen to submit these documents to 
the Utah Court of Appeals since the people involved include, Mary Dahlberg, California 
Deputy Attorney General of California, and Barry Brooks the Attorney General of Texas. 
Both have written and submitted briefs upholding Utah as the venue of jurisdiction. 
Ms Dahlberg is handling this case since the Plaintiff, Gerald Lundahl, M.D. filed 
an appeal against the California Superior Court of Orange California, the Honorable Julee 
Robinson presiding. Miss Dahlberg's official duties are to over-see Family Law in the 
state of California. 
Mr. Barry Brooks of the Attorney General's office of Texas, who was the "offical 
observer" directing UIFSA (Uniform Interstate Family Support Act) and giving direct in-
put to the UIFSA mandates . Mr. Barry Brooks is considered an expert on family law. 
See the following documents attached in the Attachment of this matter. 
1 See Respondent's Attachment 
2 | In pertinent part 
3 
4 I 5) Amicus Curiae Brief ,Barry Brooks, Attorney General of Texas 
5 6) Amicus Letter Brief to California Appellate Court (invitation by the court) 
6 7) Letter Brief, California Deputy Attorney General, Mary Dahlberg 
7 
21. California AG-Opposition to Appellant's request for judicial Notice. 
9 I 22. California AG-"Respondent Intervenor" Brief. 
10 23. California AG-Opposition to writ of Supersedeas 
11 24. California AG- Motion for Judicial Notice 
12 20. Orange County District Attorney's Office-Response to Plaintiffs motion to 
13 vacate. 
14 25. Orange County District Attorney's Office- Response to Plaintiffs Motion to 
15 I stay proceedings supplemental as ordered by Court. 
16 
17 | Respectfully, 
18 1 ^J? / 
19 f^/flW^JJ ' y"~*-™^^ Datei/a/^-*.? 2003 
20 | Marlene Telford (Lundahl) 
4139 North Devonshire 
21 I Prove, Utah, 84604 
22 In Pro Se 
23 I (Tel) (901) 225-2051 
24 
25 
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SERVICE LIST 
David Drake, Esq Petitioner's Utah Counsel 
6905 S. 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Mary Dahlberg, Esq Attorney for Intervenor 
Deputy Attorney General (Orange County for Respondent) 
1300 "I" Street, Suite 125 
P.O Box 944255 
Sacramento California,94244-2550 
Hon Clerk [10 copies] 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South, State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Appellate Court [8 copies] 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City Utah, 84114 
Barry J. Brooks Amicus Brief, Letter Brief 
3500 Cassava Drive 
Austin, TX 78746-6691 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Fourth District Court, Utah County 
125 North, 100 West 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
PROOF OF SERIVCE 
I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within action. 
On December 1, 2003 I personally served the foregoing document Opening 
Brief and related documents at the Appellate Court 450 South, State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah as well as serving personally the same on the interested parties in 
this action. 
Executed on December 1, 2003 at Provo, Utah. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
Amanda North 
2233 North 800 West 
Linden Utah 
